The shape of warfare is evolving and there are significant challenges for western militaries adapting to the more diffuse battle space and shifting from large scale maneuver to a counter insurgency style of warfare. This project examines the organizational cultures of the two militaries at the forefront of the Global War on Terror.
It seeks to identify whether they are relevant in organizational cultural terms for the challenges that they are facing now and will face in the future. The research reveals some inadequacies in both organizations that will require some bold cultural corrections if success on the battlefield is going to be found without an exorbitant cost. A broad suggestion for implementing cultural change drawn from personal experience is offered by way of conclusion.
US AND UK MILITARY CULTURAL RELEVANCE FOR FUTURE WARFARE
The innovator has for enemies all those who prospered under the old regime' -Niccholo Machiavelli
The Prince
Machiavelli's observation has as much relevance today as when it was first penned. It is a perfectly natural part of the human condition that most people are resistant to change. When confronted with a changed environment those who fail to adapt will soon be left behind; it is a simple Darwinian fact. When transposed from the individual to a collective group or organization the ease with which change can be conducted becomes increasingly difficult as other interwoven vested interests are at stake, not least of all the underlying culture of the organization.
The underlying question that this paper seeks to address is a problem that is vexing most military organizations, how do we adapt to the challenges of 21 st Century warfare? If one accepts the premise that the very nature of warfare has changed then so has its cultural context. How ready are the military cultures of the USA and UK for the challenges these changes provide?
In this paper I will briefly give a definition of 4 th and 5 th generation warfare before examining a broad military culture in both the US and UK armies, in order to identify some of the cultural problems in dealing with 21 st Century warfare. I will use the GLOBE methodology as outlined by Gerras, Wong and Allen in their paper Organizational Culture: Applying A Hybrid Model to the US Army. I will examine both the US and British Armies against key parts of the GLOBE model. I will not seek to offer solutions but merely identify areas that may require further work and I will conclude by offering 2 some techniques that might be used to effect cultural change drawn from personal experience. I will not attempt to examine national cultures although it would be a sound starting point for a more detailed examination of the subject.
Future Warfare
There is a growing body of writers who believe that the character of war has It is worthwhile examining this fundamental difference in officer selection criteria.
Firstly there are basic differences largely driven by the different size of the 2 armies. Officers, are graduates but a first degree is not a requirement to lead men -a basic level of leadership potential is however. All British Officers are selected in the three and a half day Army Officer Selection Board process at Westbury from which about 30% of attendees will be selected for Officer Training. The battery of tests examines everything from academic ability, through planning skills, team and group interaction, physical tests and fitness. The purpose of this is simple, to establish whether the potential officer has the requisite level of leadership potential that with a year at Sandhurst he would be fit to lead British soldiers. This is a time tested process and whilst it is not unknown it is rare to find young officers who have failed to meet the leadership challenge laid before them.
It is not as egalitarian as the American system perhaps but it is entirely a meritocracy.
In the British Army the holiest of sacred cows is the Regimental system that in various forms has served the Army well for over 350 years. It continues to flourish albeit in a rather more diffuse design than many would like but it has evolved to meet the 
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That is not to say that warfighting and all arms coordination are over rated or should be of secondary importance, they should not. Warfighting must be the gold standard but it should be relevant and encompass the complexity of the modern and future battle space not seek to replicate some outmoded notion of manoeuvre warfare on the German Plain or the Arabian desert. The British concept of the Adaptive Foundation i.e. train for 'a war not the war' is entirely justified and the US Army must be careful not to dismiss the expertise born of Air Land Battle too quickly in pursuit of the short term success that current operations demand. Warfighting experience is plentiful in both Armies but the fixation with high performance orientation and its supporting empirical data from outmoded measurement systems will quickly serve to disillusion the young blades. Training must be realistic and relevant but also not so narrow in focus that the challenges for the future are put off indefinitely in the search for a quick fix in the current fight.
Assertiveness. Linked inextricably to high performance orientation is the aspect of assertiveness where on the one hand there is a failure to assert coupled with too much assertiveness. What do I mean here? For the individual the fear of appearing disloyal means there is a reluctance to assert upwards and to speak out against poor decisions or even to offer sage advice to superiors. Arguably this a natural curse of the hierarchical system which is the military way. The blend of the need for robust assertiveness to get things done when lives are at risk balanced in turn with a need for feedback to ensure that the best possible solutions that reduce the risk of casualties are taken is difficult.
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Always at the forefront of people's minds is the need to achieve success collectively without descent in to some utopian chat shop where no decision is taken . Their paper puts forward some very sound ideas as to how to effect cultural change in the US Army but it is debatable whether either the US Army or the nation as a whole is ready for some of the detailed changes proposed to US Army culture. The method of effecting change is as applicable to the British Army and I do not intend to regurgitate their proposed solutions but merely offer a few thoughts on leading change from the medium of leading change as a Battalion commander and as a Change Committee member as a 320 year old regiment merged in to a new identity. I will not dwell on specific examples as the paper is too short to permit that but the underlying principles remain the same at the strategic level and can be applied to the cultural change needed to cope with 21 st Century warfare.
First and underpinning cultural change there must be a collective belief that there is a need for change which in turn will probably have been driven by a changed environment. Implicit in the need for change is criticism of the status quo and those responsible for it. The danger with this is that it requires some very grown up thinking and acceptance by individuals that the way they have been doing things were not as good as they might have been. Implicit in the Gerras, Wong and Allen paper's description of Officer selection for the US Army is that the quality of officers generally is flawed, this is not so but an even higher quality line could be reached with a shift away from egalitarianism. The British Army's Officer Selection has evolved from a wartime model from the Second World War and has proven to be highly effective yet the process of selection for Regiment or corps still has something of the nepotistic air about it yet it seems to work effectively.
Once that change is accepted as being inevitable there is a need to communicate it and the reason for it. For this to be successful the adoption of a 'one size fits all' strategy will not work. The strategic leader seeking to effect the cultural change faces a wide number of constituencies the most difficult of which is likely to be 'the dinosaur vote' i.e. those that have gone before and none will be more critical or dangerous than those who have filled his own shoes. A consensus will need to be built behind the scenes to ensure that there are no 'slings and arrows' from the flanks. A reduction of power distance in the US Army would be for many perceived as the tip of a dangerous iceberg that could erode the whole discipline and focus of the force. Yet for the force to really flourish the power distance and excess testosterone needs to be reduced. A similar problem of Power Distance exists in the British Army but is perhaps less visible which is perhaps more a societal reflection than a purely military one. The need to balance the requirements of the hierarchical structure against openness will remain a challenge but if the caliber of commanders is correct and their personal confidence high enough then the need to create power distance to compensate for any insecurities will be less
Once the change has been decided upon then bold action is required to ensure it is effected promptly and cleanly to ensure that it becomes embedded in the culture quickly. Thereafter there is no time for complacency because there must be perceptible quick wins to ensure that the organization sees the benefit of the change in a tangible sense. If those quick wins come about there will be a very quick growth in stature and success and this becomes self-feeding. What must be avoided at all costs is for the advances to stagnate in self-satisfaction and the strategic leader must have the 17 requisite drive and energy to continue to push the changes forward. Here assertiveness comes to the fore but in turn there is a requirement to balance that with regulating power distance to ensure the change is powered through but also that constituency voices are heard and not repressed.
The single biggest factor once the need for change is identified is the strategic leader's personal example -that alone can decide whether the enterprise succeeds or fails. It will be a canny balancing act of the GLOBE dimensions of Institutional Collectivism, Power Distance, High Performance Orientation and Assertiveness whilst using embedding and transmitting techniques to ensure the cultural change is driven through, takes hold and replaces that which existed formerly.
But perhaps the final thought on how best to confront future challenges lies not purely in organisational culture but in something altogether simpler.
'Preparation for war is an expensive, burdensome business, yet there is one important part of it that costs little -study. However changed and strange the new conditions of war may be, not only generals but politicians and ordinary citizens, may find there is much to be learned from the past that can be applied to the future. 
